

FROM PROCLAMATION TO IMPLEMENTATION

Understanding the Gap Between Government Announcements and Policy Outcomes

A Research Paper on Policy, Governance, and Geopolitical Implementation

Lead Researcher: Raj Laxmi

Research Associates:

Khalil Muhd Ibrahim,

Vidhi,

Dr. Alisha Fatima,

Riddhima Singh,

Federer Sabbi,

Dheepali

Research Unit: ATLAS FORUM * NSRI

Research Area: International Relations, Public Policy, Governance & Geopolitical Analysis

August 2026

ABSTRACT

Governments routinely announce ambitious reforms, welfare programmes, international commitments, and institutional transformations. Such proclamations can signal political priorities, mobilise public attention, establish legitimacy, and create expectations of governmental action. Yet the announcement of a policy is fundamentally different from its implementation. Between political commitment and measurable public outcomes lies a complex chain of administrative capacity, fiscal resources, institutional coordination, frontline discretion, political incentives, monitoring, and public participation.

This paper examines why governments rely on public proclamations and why many announcements fail to translate into effective policy implementation. Drawing upon implementation scholarship, public-policy theory, governance literature, and selected domestic and international examples, the study conceptualises the phenomenon as an **implementation gap** between policy intent and policy outcomes. It integrates top-down, bottom-up, ambiguity-conflict, institutional, and adaptive perspectives to demonstrate that implementation is not merely the final stage of policymaking but a dynamic political and institutional process.

The research argues that proclamations should not automatically be interpreted as empty political rhetoric. Government communication can serve legitimate democratic and administrative purposes, including agenda-setting, public information, stakeholder mobilisation, and accountability. However, the political value of announcing a policy can accrue immediately, whereas its administrative benefits may require years of sustained implementation. This asymmetry creates incentives for governments to prioritise visible announcements over less visible institutional work.

The paper concludes that narrowing the proclamation–implementation gap requires clearer policy objectives, realistic fiscal commitments, stronger intergovernmental coordination, empowered local institutions, continuous evaluation, frontline feedback, and transparent communication. Ultimately, the effectiveness of governance should be measured not by the visibility of government announcements but by their capacity to produce sustained improvements in citizens' lived experiences.

Keywords: public policy, policy implementation, government proclamations, implementation gap, governance, political communication, institutional capacity, geopolitics, public administration, policy outcomes

1. INTRODUCTION

Modern governments operate in an environment in which political communication has become inseparable from policymaking. Governments announce reforms through parliamentary statements, executive speeches, policy documents, international summits, press conferences, social-media platforms, and official communications. These announcements can attract immediate public attention and establish a government's priorities.

However, **announcement is not implementation.**

A government may declare an ambitious programme, establish a target, sign an international agreement, or promise institutional reform while the practical effects experienced by citizens remain limited. The distance between what governments announce and what eventually occurs on the ground constitutes one of the persistent challenges of public administration and governance.

The Oxford University Press defines a proclamation as an official public statement concerning an important matter. The concept therefore fundamentally concerns **communication**. Policy, by contrast, involves a broader framework through which governmental objectives are translated into decisions, programmes, rules, and actions. Public policy may consequently be understood as what governments choose to do or not to do in response to public problems (Howlett & Cashore, 2014; Khan, 2016).

This distinction matters because governments can receive political and symbolic benefits from communicating an intention before implementation has generated measurable results. Public announcements can signal responsiveness, establish political priorities, reassure citizens during crises, mobilise stakeholders, and strengthen perceptions of legitimacy. At the same time, implementation requires administrative machinery, funding, coordination, institutional authority, monitoring, and adaptation.

The central research question of this paper is:

Why do governments rely on public proclamations, and why do many of these announcements fail to translate into effective policy implementation?

The paper examines this question through an interdisciplinary framework combining political communication, public policy, governance, institutional theory, and international relations.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a **qualitative and comparative research design**. It synthesises contributions from the ATLAS FORUM research team with established scholarship on policy implementation, political communication, institutional theory, and governance.

Secondary academic literature, institutional reports, and selected domestic and international policy cases are used to examine the mechanisms through which policy proclamations are translated, delayed, modified, or prevented from producing intended outcomes.

The research employs comparative case analysis to identify recurring patterns across domestic governance and international relations. The study is analytical rather than statistical. Its purpose is to develop an explanatory framework for understanding the proclamation–implementation gap and to identify the institutional and political conditions that influence policy outcomes.

The research incorporates contributions from **Khalil Muhd Ibrahim, Vidhi, Dr. Alisha Fatima, Riddhima Singh, Federer Sabbi, and Dheepali**, under the research leadership of **Raj Laxmi**.

3. CONCEPTUALISING THE PROCLAMATION–IMPLEMENTATION GAP

A useful starting point is to distinguish four stages:

Political intention → Policy proclamation → Policy implementation → Policy outcome

A proclamation communicates what the government intends to achieve. Implementation concerns the processes through which that intention is converted into administrative action. An outcome concerns the actual effects of those actions.

The relationship can therefore be represented as:

Announcement ≠ Policy Design ≠ Implementation ≠ Outcome

This distinction is central to understanding why ambitious government announcements can coexist with weak public outcomes.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) demonstrated that policy implementation involves a sequence of decisions and interactions across multiple institutions. As the number of actors and administrative stages increases, opportunities for delay, disagreement, and failure also increase.

The implementation gap is therefore not necessarily evidence that a government deliberately made a false promise. It may instead emerge because the institutional conditions required to implement a policy were underestimated.

Figure 1

The Policy Lifecycle and Potential Points of Implementation Failure

Political Problem



Policy Agenda



Public Proclamation



Policy Design



Resource Allocation



Implementation



Monitoring



Evaluation



Policy Outcome



Feedback and Adaptation

Note. Developed by the authors based on the policy implementation literature reviewed in this study.

4. WHY GOVERNMENTS MAKE PUBLIC PROCLAMATIONS

4.1 Agenda-Setting and Political Prioritisation

One important function of a proclamation is to place an issue on the political agenda.

Kingdon's (1995) **Multiple Streams Framework** explains policymaking through the interaction of three streams:

1. **Problem stream** – recognition of an issue as requiring governmental attention.
2. **Policy stream** – development of potential solutions.

3. **Politics stream** – political conditions, public opinion, elections, and changes of government.

When these streams converge, a **policy window** may open.

Public proclamation can therefore communicate that a problem has acquired political importance or that a particular solution has gained governmental support. However, political attention can precede administrative readiness. A government may successfully announce a priority before the necessary institutional arrangements, funding, or political consensus have been secured.

Consequently, **political agenda-setting should not be confused with implementation capacity**.

4.2 Public Communication and Democratic Engagement

Government communication also has legitimate democratic purposes.

The OECD (2021) conceptualises public communication as a government function involving informing, listening, and responding to citizens in pursuit of the public good. Communication can support policy design, public-service delivery, transparency, and democratic participation.

A proclamation can therefore:

- inform citizens about governmental intentions;
- prepare affected communities for upcoming changes;
- encourage public participation;
- communicate eligibility or procedural requirements;
- create channels for stakeholder engagement.

This is particularly important for policies whose success depends upon public cooperation or behavioural change.

The critical distinction is between **public-interest communication** and communication primarily designed to generate political advantage. The same announcement can contain useful public information while simultaneously producing political benefits for those making it.

4.3 Legitimacy and Political Responsiveness

Governments also communicate policy commitments to demonstrate that they recognise public problems.

Suchman's (1995) theory of organisational legitimacy describes legitimacy as a perception that an organisation's actions are appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs.

Applied cautiously to public governance, this suggests that announcements concerning poverty, public health, inequality, corruption, education, or climate change can communicate governmental responsiveness.

However:

A declaration of commitment demonstrates political intention; it does not demonstrate implementation capacity.

Authority, funding, institutional capability, and administrative coordination must still exist for that commitment to become an outcome.

4.4 Symbolic Politics

Political communication also has a symbolic dimension.

Edelman (1964) demonstrated how political language and symbols can influence what societies perceive as important, threatening, possible, or desirable. Public proclamations can therefore reassure citizens, mobilise political support, establish narratives, and shape perceptions of governmental action.

This does not mean that every proclamation is political theatre.

Rather, the important analytical distinction is between **symbolic value** and **material delivery**.

A government may gain recognition for identifying a problem even before the underlying policy produces measurable change. The critical question is whether symbolic commitment is subsequently supported by administrative decisions, resources, implementation mechanisms, and evaluation.

4.5 Strategic Ambiguity

Another reason governments may use broad language is that ambiguity can facilitate coalition-building.

Eisenberg (1984) argues that ambiguity can function strategically in organisational communication by allowing actors with different interests to attach different interpretations to the same broad message.

In policy contexts, phrases such as *inclusive growth*, *transformative governance*, or *reforming public services* can attract support from diverse constituencies without immediately resolving every disagreement over policy instruments.

This flexibility may be useful during agenda-setting.

However, ambiguity becomes problematic when implementation requires:

- measurable objectives;
- clearly defined responsibilities;
- timelines;
- funding arrangements;
- monitoring indicators;
- institutional accountability.

Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict framework demonstrates that the degree of ambiguity and conflict surrounding a policy can significantly affect how implementation unfolds.

5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The proclamation–implementation gap cannot be explained through a single theory. It emerges from several interacting institutional and political mechanisms.

5.1 Top-Down Implementation

The classical top-down approach emphasises clear objectives, central authority, and control over implementation.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) demonstrated that implementation becomes increasingly difficult when a policy requires cooperation across multiple decision points.

Even relatively small failures at individual stages can accumulate into substantial implementation problems.

Thus:

The more complex the implementation chain, the greater the number of opportunities for policy deviation.

5.2 Bottom-Up Implementation

Lipsky's (1980) concept of **street-level bureaucracy** challenges the assumption that policies are implemented exactly as designed.

Frontline officials such as teachers, health workers, inspectors, local administrators, and welfare officers exercise discretion because they encounter practical circumstances that policymakers may not have anticipated.

This means that implementation is partly **co-produced at the frontline**.

The policy written in a central government document may therefore differ from the policy experienced by citizens.

5.3 Ambiguity-Conflict Model

Matland (1995) argues that implementation is shaped substantially by two variables:

- **policy ambiguity**
- **policy conflict**

Where objectives are unclear or stakeholders disagree over means and priorities, implementation becomes more difficult.

This helps explain why governments can sometimes reach consensus around a broad proclamation while struggling to agree on its operational details.

5.4 Institutional Theory

North (1990) distinguishes between formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, and informal institutions, including norms, incentives, and power relationships.

A policy can therefore fail even when its formal rules appear sound if informal political and institutional incentives undermine implementation.

This is particularly relevant to international relations.

International agreements may create formal commitments, while national security interests, domestic political incentives, economic priorities, and sovereignty concerns influence actual behaviour.

6. MAJOR CAUSES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP

The research identifies several recurring causes.

6.1 Limited Political Will

Political attention can decline after the announcement has achieved its immediate objective.

6.2 Fiscal Constraints

Ambitious policies require sustained financial resources. Fiscal deficits, delayed transfers, competing priorities, and inadequate local revenues can prevent implementation.

6.3 Bureaucratic Capacity

Policies depend upon institutions possessing sufficient personnel, expertise, infrastructure, technology, and organisational capability.

6.4 Fragmented Governance

Multiple departments and agencies may possess overlapping responsibilities without sufficiently clear coordination mechanisms.

6.5 Ambiguous Policy Design

Broad objectives without measurable implementation indicators make accountability difficult.

6.6 Weak Monitoring and Evaluation

Without reliable monitoring, governments may not detect implementation failures until they become politically or socially significant.

6.7 Local Capacity Constraints

National policies frequently depend upon state, municipal, or community-level institutions whose capacity varies significantly.

6.8 Political and Institutional Conflict

Different actors may interpret the same policy according to their own interests, institutional mandates, or political incentives.

6.9 Public Communication Failures

Poor communication can produce misinformation, distrust, exclusion, and weak public participation.

7. THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation gap is not limited to domestic welfare policies. It is equally significant in international relations.

International commitments frequently involve a fundamental structural problem:

States make collective commitments but retain divergent national interests.

This creates an important distinction between **international proclamation** and **domestic implementation**.

7.1 The Paris Agreement

The 2015 Paris Agreement established the collective objective of holding global temperature increases to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts toward 1.5°C.

The agreement relies substantially on nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

The implementation challenge arises because states face different:

- development priorities;
- energy requirements;
- fiscal capacities;
- technological capabilities;
- domestic political pressures.

UNEP emissions assessments have repeatedly indicated a substantial gap between current policies and the emissions reductions required to achieve the agreement's temperature goals.

The case illustrates how international consensus does not automatically eliminate national-interest conflicts.

7.2 Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations adopted **17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets** in 2015 with a 2030 deadline.

The goals represent an exceptionally ambitious global proclamation of development priorities.

Yet implementation is mediated by national institutions with dramatically different fiscal, administrative, and technological capacities.

The UN's 2024 SDG progress assessment indicated that only a minority of targets were on track, demonstrating the substantial distance between global commitments and actual progress.

The SDGs therefore illustrate the problem of **global ambition without uniform implementation capacity**.

7.3 Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty established commitments relating to non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and eventual disarmament.

Yet nuclear deterrence, strategic competition, distrust, and security dilemmas have continued to shape state behaviour.

The existence of multiple nuclear-armed states demonstrates the limits of formal international commitments when they interact with national-security imperatives.

The lesson is not that international institutions are irrelevant.

Rather, **institutional commitments operate within a geopolitical environment shaped by power and security interests**.

7.4 Trade Governance and Protectionism

The World Trade Organization represents a major institutional commitment to rules-based international trade.

However, the rise of trade disputes, industrial subsidies, tariffs, strategic export controls, and economic-security policies demonstrates how domestic political and strategic interests can override broader commitments to market openness.

The US–China trade conflict is particularly significant because it demonstrates the increasing fusion of:

Trade + Technology + National Security + Geopolitical Competition

This indicates that implementation of international economic rules cannot be understood separately from the changing distribution of global power.

8. COMPARATIVE DOMESTIC CASES

8.1 India: Sanitation and Open Defecation

India's sanitation campaign illustrates the complexity of measuring policy outcomes.

Government declarations concerning sanitation can generate substantial political momentum, but actual implementation depends upon infrastructure, behavioural change, household access, local administration, monitoring, and verification.

This illustrates an important methodological issue:

Administrative achievement and lived outcomes are not always identical.

A programme may report completion of infrastructure targets while citizens continue to experience deficiencies in access, maintenance, or service quality.

8.2 United States: COVID-19 Relief

The US CARES Act represented an enormous fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis.

Yet translating federal commitments into timely state and local assistance depended on administrative systems, eligibility mechanisms, intergovernmental coordination, and local capacity.

The case demonstrates that even where financial resources exist, **delivery infrastructure can determine the speed and effectiveness of implementation.**

8.3 China: Poverty Eradication

China's declaration of victory over extreme poverty represented a major political and developmental milestone.

However, the verification and measurement of such an achievement demonstrate a broader problem in policy evaluation: governments must distinguish between **declared achievement, administrative indicators, and independent measurement of outcomes.**

The case therefore raises questions concerning measurement, verification, and accountability in large-scale policy claims.

9. FISCAL CAPACITY, DEVOLUTION, AND GOVERNANCE

A major contribution of the research is its emphasis on the institutional foundations of implementation.

9.1 Fiscal Capacity

No government can implement an unlimited number of commitments with limited resources.

Ambitious proclamations may become ineffective when:

- budget allocations are insufficient;
- transfers are delayed;
- local governments lack revenue;
- expenditure priorities change;
- implementation costs are underestimated.

Fiscal capacity therefore forms the material foundation of policy credibility.

9.2 Devolution

Devolution involves transferring administrative responsibilities, decision-making authority, and financial responsibilities to lower levels of government.

In India, local governments can face constraints arising from limited fiscal autonomy, administrative dependence, and uneven institutional capacity.

This creates a fundamental governance problem:

Responsibility without adequate authority or resources produces implementation without capacity.

Effective devolution therefore requires not merely assigning responsibilities but providing adequate institutional, administrative, and financial capacity.

9.3 Citizen-Centred Service Delivery

A citizen-centred approach organises public services around people's actual experiences rather than solely around administrative departments.

For example, education, employment, healthcare, and social security may intersect around a single individual's experience.

This approach is valuable because citizens do not experience government according to departmental boundaries.

They experience **the state as a system**.

Consequently, implementation should be evaluated from the perspective of lived outcomes rather than solely from the perspective of administrative procedure.

10. DIGITAL COMMUNICATION AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Digital communication has transformed the relationship between governments and citizens.

Governments can now communicate policy announcements instantly through:

- social media;
- government portals;

- digital public infrastructure;
- online consultations;
- mobile applications;
- open-data platforms.

However, communication should not remain a one-way process.

Effective policy communication requires:

Government → Information → Public → Feedback → Government

rather than:

Government → Announcement → Public

Digital communication can therefore become part of the implementation mechanism itself.

Multilingual communication, accessibility, transparent information, citizen feedback, and accurate data can improve public participation and institutional trust.

At the same time, digital governance raises concerns regarding:

- misinformation;
- algorithmic transparency;
- unequal digital access;
- privacy;
- freedom of expression;
- data quality.

Thus, communication can either narrow or widen the proclamation–implementation gap.

11. IMPLEMENTATION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

Implementation should not be understood as a static stage following policy adoption.

Policies evolve through interaction among:

1. **Policy image**
2. **Policy venue**
3. **Information processing**
4. **Institutional friction**
5. **Feedback and adaptation**

A policy may encounter new information after implementation begins. Citizens may respond differently than expected. Technology may change. Economic conditions may shift. Political leadership may change.

Therefore, implementation requires **adaptive governance**.

A policy that is revised because evidence reveals an implementation problem should not automatically be classified as a failure.

Sometimes:

The capacity to revise a policy is evidence of institutional learning.

12. POLITICAL TIME VS. POLICY TIME

One of the significant findings emerging from this research is the mismatch between **political time** and **policy time**.

Political systems often operate according to:

- election cycles;
- media cycles;
- budget cycles;
- public opinion;
- immediate crises.

Policy implementation often operates according to:

- institutional development;
- infrastructure construction;
- behavioural change;
- capacity building;
- long-term evaluation.

This creates an inherent tension.

Political Time

Announcement → Visibility → Public Expectation

Policy Time

Design → Funding → Institution-Building → Implementation → Evaluation → Adaptation → Outcome

The political reward for an announcement can arrive immediately.

The social return from implementation may take years.

This asymmetry creates an incentive structure in which governments may sometimes prefer **visible announcements over less visible institutional work**.

This is one of the central mechanisms underlying the proclamation–implementation gap.

13. FINDINGS

The comparative analysis produces five principal findings.

Finding 1: Political visibility can precede administrative readiness.

Governments can announce priorities before the institutions responsible for implementation possess sufficient resources, authority, or coordination mechanisms.

Finding 2: Implementation capacity is uneven.

The same policy can produce different outcomes across regions because administrative, fiscal, technological, and institutional capacities vary.

Finding 3: Ambiguity can facilitate political consensus while complicating implementation.

Broad objectives may enable governments to build coalitions, but implementation requires clarity regarding responsibilities, resources, timelines, and measurable outcomes.

Finding 4: International commitments are constrained by national interests.

International agreements operate within a geopolitical environment in which states retain strategic, economic, and security priorities.

Finding 5: Feedback and evaluation determine whether implementation can adapt.

Policies are more capable of producing sustainable outcomes when governments can identify implementation failures, receive frontline feedback, and modify policies in response to evidence.

14. IMPLEMENTATION CREDIBILITY FRAMEWORK

Based on the literature and cases examined, this research proposes an **Implementation Credibility Framework**.

A credible proclamation should pass through six interconnected conditions:

1. CLARITY

What exactly is being promised?

2. CAPACITY

Which institutions will implement it?

3. RESOURCES

What financial, technological, and human resources are available?

4. COORDINATION

How will different levels and agencies cooperate?

5. FEEDBACK

How will citizens and frontline workers communicate implementation problems?

6. EVALUATION

How will success be measured independently?

The framework can therefore be represented as:

PROCLAMATION

↓

CLARITY

↓

CAPACITY

↓

RESOURCES

↓

COORDINATION

↓

IMPLEMENTATION




Figure 2

Implementation Credibility Framework Proposed by the Authors

Note. Developed by the authors through synthesis of the policy implementation, governance, and political communication literature reviewed in this study.

15. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

15.1 Make Policy Objectives Measurable

Governments should translate broad political commitments into measurable indicators, timelines, responsibilities, and expected outcomes.

15.2 Link Announcements to Fiscal Commitments

Major proclamations should be accompanied by realistic estimates of implementation costs and identifiable sources of funding.

15.3 Strengthen Local Institutions

Devolution should transfer not only responsibility but also adequate authority, resources, expertise, and institutional capacity.

15.4 Improve Inter-Agency Coordination

Governments should establish clearly defined institutional responsibilities and coordination mechanisms before major programmes are launched.

15.5 Institutionalise Ex Post Evaluation

Policies should be evaluated after implementation to determine whether intended outcomes were achieved and whether unintended consequences emerged.

15.6 Integrate Frontline Feedback

Teachers, health workers, local administrators, civil society organisations, and citizens should participate in continuous implementation feedback.

15.7 Separate Political Communication from Performance Measurement

Government communication should not substitute for independent evaluation.

15.8 Treat Adaptation as Governance Capacity

Policy revision should be understood as a legitimate response to evidence rather than automatically as evidence of failure.

16. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study focuses primarily on the relationship between governmental communication, policy design, institutional capacity, and implementation outcomes. It does not attempt to measure the effectiveness of every proclamation examined, nor does it claim that policy announcements are inherently politically motivated or deceptive.

The selected cases are illustrative rather than statistically representative. The study is primarily qualitative and analytical, and therefore does not establish causal relationships through statistical testing.

Further empirical research using country-level implementation data, longitudinal case studies, and comparative policy indicators could test and refine the explanatory framework developed in this paper.

17. CONCLUSION

Public proclamations are an indispensable component of modern governance. They can identify problems, establish priorities, communicate governmental intentions, mobilise citizens, build political legitimacy, and initiate collective action.

The problem emerges when **communication becomes detached from implementation.**

The evidence examined in this research demonstrates that the proclamation–implementation gap is rarely produced by a single failure. It emerges from an interaction among political incentives, institutional capacity, fiscal constraints, bureaucratic discretion, intergovernmental coordination, ambiguous objectives, weak monitoring, geopolitical interests, and communication failures.

The international cases demonstrate that the problem becomes even more complex when commitments cross national boundaries. Climate agreements, development goals, nuclear governance, and international trade rules all encounter the fundamental reality that institutions operate within competing national interests and unequal capacities.

At the domestic level, citizens experience policy not as a government announcement but through the actual quality of services they receive.

This produces the central conclusion of the study:

The credibility of a government is determined less by what it announces than by what its institutions can consistently deliver.

A proclamation can create expectation.

A policy can establish intent.

An institution can create capacity.

But only implementation can create outcomes.

The future of effective governance therefore depends on moving beyond a politics of announcement toward a **politics of implementation**: one grounded in fiscal realism, institutional capacity, local empowerment, evidence, continuous evaluation, stakeholder participation, and adaptive governance.

In an increasingly complex geopolitical environment, states that can translate strategic intent into reliable institutional execution may ultimately possess an advantage greater than that offered by rhetoric alone.

The real test of policy is not whether it can be proclaimed, but whether it can survive contact with reality.

18. REFERENCES

- Edelman, M. (1964). *The symbolic uses of politics*. University of Illinois Press.
- Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. *Communication Monographs*, 51(3), 227–242. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758409390197>
- Howlett, M., & Cashore, B. (2014). Conceptualizing public policy. In I. Engeli & C. R. Allison (Eds.), *Comparative policy studies: Conceptual and methodological challenges* (pp. 17–33). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Khan, A. R. (2016). Policy implementation: Some aspects and issues. *Journal of Community Positive Practices*.
- Kingdon, J. W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies* (2nd ed.). HarperCollins College Publishers.
- Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5(2), 145–174. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037242>
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2021). *OECD report on public communication: The global context and the way forward*. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/22f8031c-en>
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025). *Government at a glance 2025*. OECD Publishing.
- Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1984). *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; Or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all*. University of California Press.
- Stauffer, B. (2026). Implementation punctuation: The role of feedback, narratives, and implementation in punctuated equilibrium theory. *Policy Studies Journal*, 54(2), e70095.
- Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 571–610. <https://doi.org/10.2307/258788>
- Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. *Journal of Public Policy*, 6(4), 371–398. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219>
-

19. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was developed collaboratively through the contributions of the **ATLAS FORUM Research & Policy Unit**.

The research team acknowledges the intellectual contributions of **Khalil Muhd Ibrahim, Vidhi, Dr. Alisha Fatima, Riddhima Singh, Federer Sabbi, and Dheepali**, whose individual submissions contributed conceptual arguments, theoretical perspectives, case studies, and governance analysis to the final research.

The research was led and synthesised by **Raj Laxmi**, who coordinated the research direction, integrated the submitted material, developed the comparative analytical framework, and consolidated the final manuscript.

The team also acknowledges the scholars, institutions, governmental organisations, and international organisations whose published research and policy documents informed this study. Particular recognition is extended to the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), NITI Aayog, United Nations system, and academic scholarship on policy implementation, governance, political communication, and institutional theory** for providing important conceptual and empirical foundations for the research.

The views and synthesis presented in this paper represent the analytical work of the research team and do not necessarily represent the official position of any cited institution.